The FISA Court and Article III by Vladeck, Stephen I.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 72 | Issue 3 Article 4
Summer 6-1-2015
The FISA Court and Article III
Stephen I. Vladeck
American University Washington College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Privacy Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation




The FISA Court and Article III 
Stephen I. Vladeck 
Although it has existed for nearly forty years, the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) has received newfound 
attention (and criticism) after, and in light of the 2013 disclosures 
of a series of controversial U.S. surveillance programs by former 
NSA contractor Edward Snowden. Among other things, the 
Snowden disclosures precipitated suggestions from at least some 
circles that the FISC had failed to serve as a meaningful check on 
the Executive Branch, at least largely because it had too easily 
accepted and signed off on the government’s debatable (if not 
dubious) interpretations of the relevant statutory authorities.1 
Contemporary critics of the role of the FISC have tended to 
focus on (1) the one-sided nature of most—if not all—proceedings 
before the court; (2) the unique (and perhaps troubling) role of the 
Chief Justice of the United States in selecting all of the FISC’s 
judges—along with those of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court of Review (FISCR)—without any outside input or oversight; 
and (3) the unconvincing reasoning in at least some of the key 
FISC opinions upholding the telephone metadata program.2 To 
                                                                                                     
  Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. My 
thanks to Margaret Hu for inviting me to participate in the symposium for which 
this Essay was prepared. 
 1. For the most comprehensive summary and encapsulation of these 
critiques to date, see generally ELIZABETH GOITEIN & FAIZA PATEL, BRENNEN CTR. 
FOR JUSTICE, WHAT WENT WRONG WITH THE FISA COURT (2015) (analyzing 
potential constitutional concerns raised by FISC).  
 2. See id. at 29–43 (discussing constitutional concerns raised by FISC); see 
also, e.g., Orin Kerr, My (Mostly Critical) Thoughts on the August 2013 FISC 
Opinion on Section 215, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 17, 2013, 7:39 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/09/17/thoughts-august-2013-fisc-opinion-section-
215/ (last visited June 16, 2015) (analyzing and critiquing the reasoning in a FISC 
opinion sustaining the metadata program) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); Steve Vladeck, Making FISC More Adversarial: A Brief Response to 
Orin Kerr, LAWFARE (July 8, 2013, 11:46 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
making-fisc-more-adversarial-brief-response-orin-kerr (last visited Aug. 4, 2015) 
(responding to Orin Kerr’s critiques of the FISC process and advocating for the 
use of private attorneys to serve as “special advocates”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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that end, most calls for reform of the underlying surveillance 
programs disclosed by Snowden have come alongside calls for at 
least some reform of the FISC itself, whether by changing how its 
judges are appointed, providing for more regular adversarial 
participation by an outside “special advocate,” or even reassigning 
some of the FISC’s jurisdiction to “ordinary” Article III courts.3 
Whatever their merits, many of these proposed reforms have 
been met with an array of prudential and constitutional 
objections—including concerns that changes to the composition 
and structure of the FISC would implicate Articles II and III of the 
United States Constitution.4 But perhaps most remarkably, these 
objections have revealed just how little effort has been undertaken 
to explain why the FISC is constitutionally permissible in the first 
place.5 After all, the FISC is an Article III court that was designed 
to exclusively hear ex parte, in camera applications from the 
government, notwithstanding Article III’s interrelated 
requirements of a case or controversy and of meaningful 
“adverseness.”6 And although the FISCR expressly held in 2002 
that the nature of such warrant applications before the FISC 
satisfies Article III,7 its analysis was, charitably, incomplete. 
This symposium Essay aims to fill that gap. In particular, my 
goal is to unpack the relationship between the FISC and Article III 
                                                                                                     
 3. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case for a FISA “Special Advocate,” 2 
TEX. A&M L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Special Advocate]. 
 4. See, e.g., ANDREW NOLAN ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., REFORM OF THE 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTS: INTRODUCING A PUBLIC ADVOCATE 
44–46 (2014) (discussing potential constitutional problems raised by “housing the 
advocate in the judicial branch”); see also Letter from Hon. John D. Bates, 
Director, Admin. Off. of the U.S. Courts, to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary 5–7 (Aug. 5, 2014) (relating legal concerns). 
 5. See Marty Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The Constitutionality of a FISA 
“Special Advocate,” JUST SECURITY (Nov. 4, 2013, 1:34 PM), http://justsecurity.org 
/2873/fisa-special-advocate-constitution/ (last visited June 17, 2015) (arguing that 
the addition of a special advocate would not be unconstitutional, assuming the 
current proceedings are constitutional) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 6. See id. (discussing the Article III adverseness requirement and the FISA 
court). 
 7. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 732 n.19 (U.S. Foreign Intell. 
Surveil. Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam) (stating that the court did “not think there is 
much left to an argument made by an opponent of FISA in 1978 that the statutory 
responsibilities of the FISA court are inconsistent with Article III case and 
controversy responsibilities”). 
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in some detail—and to provide a more detailed framework within 
which to assess which aspects of the FISC’s caseload do and do not 
raise Article III concerns, and how contemporary reform proposals 
might assuage the former. 
To that end, after providing a brief historical overview of the 
FISC, Part I turns to the original role of the FISC under the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA),8 which 
exclusively encompassed applications for individualized 
“warrants,” albeit under a different probable cause standard than 
is typically utilized in criminal cases. As Part I documents, 
whereas FISA as originally enacted raised a host of Article III 
concerns, the statute was ultimately predicated on an analogy to 
“ordinary” warrant applications—which have long been held to 
satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement insofar as 
they are ancillary to subsequent judicial proceedings.  
Part II turns to the post-1978 practice under FISA, along with 
the September 11-era changes to FISA, especially those embodied 
within the USA PATRIOT Act of 20019 and the FISA Amendments 
Act of 2008.10 As Part II notes, leaving aside the substantive merits 
of these developments in the abstract, both undermined at least to 
some degree the Article III justifications that carried the day when 
FISA was enacted. After all, practice under “classic” FISA revealed 
how unusual it was for FISA warrants to actually lead to 
subsequent criminal or civil proceedings—and how difficult it was 
for litigants to collaterally attack FISA warrants even in the rare 
cases in which they did.  
Far more fundamentally, the authorities Congress 
subsequently provided in statutes such as the USA PATRIOT Act 
and FISA Amendments Act categorically departed from the 
warrant model insofar as they invested the FISC with the ability 
and responsibility to approve government surveillance authorities 
that are wholly untethered from a specific target, but rather 
provide for either or both bulk and programmatic collection of 
foreign intelligence surveillance. Whatever the FISC is doing when 
                                                                                                     
 8. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885 (2012)). 
 9. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8, 18, and 50 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 10. Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. (2012)). 
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it approves a government request for a production order or a 
directive, it is most certainly not approving anything that remotely 
resembles a “warrant” to conduct surveillance of an identified 
suspect. At a minimum, then, these authorities require 
fundamentally different Article III justifications (that have so far 
not been provided).  
To be sure, Congress may well have anticipated these Article 
III concerns by authorizing adversarial participation by the 
recipients of production orders under the USA PATRIOT Act11 and 
directives under the FISA Amendments Act.12 But as Part II 
concludes, the fact that such adversarial process has seldom been 
utilized opens the door to serious Article III objections—that may 
well be ameliorated through more regular participation by a 
“special advocate.” 
I. “Classic” FISA and Article III 
As has been explained in detail elsewhere, FISA 
was a response to two interrelated developments: the Supreme 
Court’s 1972 decision in the Keith case declining to articulate a 
domestic intelligence exception to the Warrant Clause of the 
Fourth Amendment,13 and a series of intelligence abuses 
documented by the Church Committee several years later.14 
Together with the creation of the congressional intelligence 
committees and a series of other reforms, FISA was part of a 
larger structural accommodation between the three branches of 
government: The Executive Branch agreed to have many of its 
foreign intelligence surveillance activities subjected to far 
greater legal oversight and accountability, in exchange for 
which Congress and the courts agreed to provide such oversight 
and accountability in secret. To that end, the core of FISA as 
originally enacted was the authority provided by Title I of the 
Act, which empowered the government to obtain secret 
warrants for electronic—and, later, physical—surveillance of 
                                                                                                     
 11. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f) (2012) (setting out procedures for judicial review 
of production orders). 
 12. See id. § 1881a(h) (authorizing directives and providing for judicial 
review thereof). 
 13. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320–21 (1972) 
(rejecting the government’s arguments for a domestic surveillance exception). 
 14. S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976). 
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individuals whom the government had probable cause to believe 
were acting as an agent, or on behalf, of a foreign power.15 
To supervise these new “FISA warrants,” Congress created a 
specialized court—the FISC—to hear government applications ex 
parte and in camera.16 The court would be staffed by seven (now 
eleven) sitting Article III district judges selected to serve seven-
year terms by the Chief Justice of the United States, three of whom 
“shall reside within 20 miles of the District of Columbia.”17 Except 
                                                                                                     
 15. Special Advocate, supra note 3 (manuscript at 2). Applications in the 
non-FISA context require probable cause to believe that the suspect committed a 
crime. FISA, in contrast, requires probable cause to believe that the target of the 
surveillance is, or is an agent of, a “foreign power.” The relaxed probable cause 
standard in the FISA context has been challenged as not satisfying the Fourth 
Amendment’s Warrant Clause. But that argument was rejected by numerous 
courts prior to September 11 2001, at least largely because of the “primary 
purpose” doctrine—which required the government to certify that the primary 
purpose of a FISA warrant was foreign intelligence surveillance and not ordinary 
law enforcement. See, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 914 
(4th Cir. 1980) (“[B]ecause of the need of the executive branch for flexibility, its 
practical experience, and its constitutional competence, the courts should not 
require the executive to secure a warrant each time it conducts foreign 
intelligence surveillance.”); see also United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 
(1st Cir. 1991) (“[T]he investigation of criminal activity cannot be the primary 
purpose of the surveillance.”).  
But when Congress abolished the primary purpose doctrine in the USA 
PATRIOT Act, the FISCR—in its first-ever published decision—nevertheless 
upheld the probable cause standard against a Fourth Amendment challenge. See 
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 736–46 (U.S. Foreign Intell. Surveil. Ct. Rev. 
2002) (per curiam) (holding that the relaxed “significant purpose” standard does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment). But see Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. 
Supp. 2d 1023, 1031 (D. Or. 2007) (holding that the lesser “significant purpose” 
standard in the USA PATRIOT Act violates the Fourth Amendment), vacated on 
other grounds, 599 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 16. Because the FISC is an inferior court created by Congress, staffed by 
Article III judges, exercising jurisdiction over what are indisputably federal 
questions, and subject to supervision within the Article III judicial system, it is 
beyond peradventure that it is an “Article III court.” See, e.g., In re Motion for 
Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486 (U.S. Foreign Intell. Surveil. 
Ct. Rev. 2007) (“Notwithstanding the esoteric nature of its caseload, the FISC is 
an inferior federal court established by Congress under Article III . . . .”). But see 
Orin Kerr, More on Article III and Appellate Review in the Leahy Bill, LAWFARE 
(Aug. 5, 2014, 3:20 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/08/more-on-article-iii-
and-appellate-review-in-the-leahy-bill/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2015) (“[I]t’s not 
obvious to me that having a federal judge review a warrant application makes 
that review an exercise of Article III power.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 17. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2012). 
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in emergencies (where, presumably, the locally resident judges 
would be available), the judges otherwise rotate through the FISC, 
such that each judge is on duty in Washington for one out of every 
eleven weeks. 
If the FISC denies the government’s application, Congress 
authorized the government to either seek rehearing before the 
entire FISC, sitting en banc, appeal to the newly created Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) staffed by three 
sitting circuit judges designated by the Chief Justice, or both.18 If 
unsuccessful there, FISA authorized the government to appeal to 
the Supreme Court.19 As originally constituted, FISA thus 
contemplated that the FISC would resolve individualized warrant 
applications on a case-by-case basis, ex parte and in camera, and 
with only the government authorized to participate—and, if 
necessary, to appeal.20 
Separate from the substantive foreign intelligence 
surveillance authorities codified in FISA, Congress justified the 
creation of a new, specialized court largely on grounds of 
expediency: “Requiring the special court to sit continuously in the 
District of Columbia will facilitate necessary security procedures 
and, by ensuring that at least one judge is always available, will 
ensure speedy access to it by the Attorney General when timeliness 
is essential for intelligence purposes.”21 Moreover, a specialized 
court would “likely . . . be able to put claims of national security in 
a better perspective and to have greater confidence in interpreting 
                                                                                                     
 18. See id. § 1803(b) (establishing a court of review). 
 19. See id. (providing for appeal to the Supreme Court). 
 20. In the first case to reach the FISCR, the Court of Review received amicus 
briefs from several parties. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719 n.1, 737 (U.S. 
Foreign Intell. Surveill. Ct. Rev. 2002) (“We are, therefore, grateful to the ACLU 
and NACDL for their briefs that vigorously contest the government’s argument.”). 
But after the FISCR ruled for the government, the Supreme Court denied the 
ACLU’s motion to intervene for purposes of filing a petition for certiorari. See 
ACLU v. United States, 538 U.S. 920, 920 (2003) (denying the ACLU’s motion for 
leave to intervene to file a petition for certiorari). 
 21. H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, at 71 (1978); see also S. REP. No. 95-701, at 12 
(1978) (“The need to preserve secrecy for sensitive counterintelligence sources and 
methods justifies . . . consolidation of judicial authority in a special court.”), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 3980. 
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this bill than judges who do not have occasion to deal with the 
surveillances under this bill.”22 
Congress’s confidence notwithstanding, at least some experts 
feared that such a categorically ex parte structure for the FISC 
would raise serious Article III concerns. Thus, then-Professor (and 
future Judge) Laurence Silberman testified that “[a]lthough it is 
true that judges have traditionally issued search warrants ex 
parte, they have done so as part of a criminal investigative process 
which . . . for the most part, leads to a trial, a traditional adversary 
proceeding.”23 FISA surveillance, in contrast, was designed 
principally (if not primarily) to facilitate foreign intelligence 
investigations—and not criminal prosecutions. Indeed, that very 
orientation away from ordinary law enforcement helped to allay 
what otherwise might have been serious Fourth Amendment (and 
prudential) objections to FISA’s lower  probable cause standard.24 
But Silberman’s objections were largely mooted by a 
memorandum (and subsequent congressional testimony) prepared 
by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). 
Although OLC agreed that the Article III question was “difficult,” 
it concluded that the structure FISA contemplated for the FISC 
was probably constitutional, both because (1) “FISA Court 
judges . . . would still be applying the law to the facts of a 
particular case” and (2) “in normal criminal cases, the government 
is permitted to persuade a court of the need for a warrant without 
the target being present.”25 In other words, the constitutional 
defense of the FISC turned on the limited scope of the review it 
was providing and the analogy to “ordinary” warrant 
applications—which, despite typically involving ex parte, in 
camera proceedings, were understood to raise no Article III 
                                                                                                     
 22. H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, at 91 (1978). 
 23. Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearings on H.R. 5794, H.R. 
9745, H.R. 7308, and H.R. 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legislation. of the H. 
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 224 (1978) (statement of 
Hon. Laurence Silberman) [hereinafter “FISA Hearings”]. 
 24. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the probable cause 
requirements in the FISA context). 
 25. FISA Hearings, supra note 23, at 26–31 (statement of John M. Harmon, 
Asst. Att’y. Gen., Office of Legal Counsel). 
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questions insofar as they were ancillary to subsequent criminal (or 
civil) proceedings.26 
To further pretermit these constitutional objections, Congress 
revised the draft of FISA to help strengthen the analogy to 
“ordinary” warrants. FISA as thus enacted required that criminal 
defendants be notified when “any information obtained or derived 
from an electronic surveillance” was to be used in their 
prosecutions.27 The statute also provided an express cause of 
action for damages for an “aggrieved person” who was subjected to 
unlawful surveillance under FISA.28 And although FISA warrants 
were not typically meant to produce evidence to be used in criminal 
prosecutions, the fact that they could be collaterally attacked in at 
least some cases provided both a vehicle for raising Article III 
objections and the rejoinder courts would supply in rejecting them. 
Thus, in United States v. Megahey,29 a district court rejected a 
criminal defendant’s attempt to suppress FISA-derived evidence 
on the ground that the proceedings before the FISC violated Article 
III.30 As Judge Sifton explained, 
Applications for electronic surveillance submitted to FISC 
pursuant to FISA involve concrete questions respecting the 
application of the Act and are in a form such that a judge is 
capable of acting on them, much as he might otherwise act on 
an ex parte application for a warrant. In the case of each 
application, the FISC judge is statutorily obliged to ensure that 
                                                                                                     
 26. In a recent article, James Pfander and Daniel Birk have identified FISA 
warrant proceedings as emblematic of a larger species of “non-contentious 
jurisdiction”—cases in which it has long been understood that Article III’s typical 
requirement of “adverseness” simply does not apply, whether or not the judicial 
review is ancillary to subsequent proceedings. James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, 
Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement, and Non-Contentious 
Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1462–65 (2015). As explained below, however, 
whatever the Article III justification for “classic” FISA warrants, neither the 
OLC’s explanation at the time FISA was enacted nor Pfander and Birk’s article 
helps to provide an Article III justification for the role of the FISC under the far 
different and more expansive judicial review scheme contemplated by the USA 
PATRIOT Act and FISA Amendments Act. See infra Part III.B (discussing the 
role of FISC under these later statutes). 
 27. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c) (2012). 
 28. Id. § 1810. 
 29. 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1197 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d, 729 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 
1983). 
 30. See id. at 1196–98 (rejecting arguments that the FISA court is 
inconsistent with constitutional requirements with regard to the judicial branch). 
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each statutory prerequisite is met by the application before he 
may enter a surveillance order. The FISC judge who is faced 
with a surveillance application is not faced with an abstract 
issue of law or called upon to issue an advisory opinion, but is, 
instead, called upon to ensure that the individuals who are 
targeted do not have their privacy interests invaded, except in 
compliance with the detailed requirements of the statute.31 
In other words, because of the analogy to ordinary warrants and 
the concrete nature of the question that the FISC’s judges were 
asked to resolve in approving a government application, the FISC 
raised no unique Article III concerns. 
Although Megahey was a district court decision, its analysis 
was widely adopted by every other court to consider an Article III 
challenge to the FISC, including in an influential 1987 Ninth 
Circuit opinion by then-Judge Anthony Kennedy.32 Thus, by the 
time the FISCR heard the government’s first-ever appeal of a 
denial of an application by the FISC in 2002, a three-judge panel 
that included Judge Silberman—who had testified against FISA in 
1978 at least in part because of Article III concerns—concluded 
that “we do not think there is much left to an argument . . . that 
the statutory responsibilities of the FISA court are inconsistent 
with Article III case and controversy responsibilities of federal 
judges because of the secret, non-adversary process.”33 
II. Modern FISA and Article III 
By the time the FISCR gave the back of its hand to the Article 
III objections to the role of the FISC in 2002, it should have known 
better, because two separate sets of flaws in the warrant analogy—
and, thus, in the constitutional defense of the FISC—had begun to 
emerge. First, it had proven increasingly difficult for warrants 
approved by the FISC to be meaningfully reviewed in subsequent 
judicial proceedings. Second, and more fundamentally, the FISC 
                                                                                                     
 31. Id. at 1197. Judge Sifton also rejected the defendant’s constitutional 
objections to the specialized nature of the court, or the manner in which the judges 
were selected. Id. at 1196–98. 
 32. See United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 791–92 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(citing Megahey and adopting its reasoning). 
 33. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 732 n.19 (U.S. Foreign Intell. Surveil. 
Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam). 
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had begun to do far more than merely approve government 
applications for foreign intelligence surveillance warrants. 
A. The Warrant Analogy as a “Razor-Thin Legal Fiction” 
Recall from above that the OLC’s constitutional defense of the 
role of the FISC turned largely on the extent to which FISA 
warrants would be ancillary to subsequent criminal or civil 
proceedings, in which they could (and presumably would) be 
subject to collateral attack.34 To that end, FISA itself required the 
government to disclose to a criminal defendant “any information 
obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance of that 
aggrieved person” whenever it “intends to enter [such information] 
into evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or 
other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, 
agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States.”35 
It then also furnished the defendant with an opportunity to seek 
to suppress the introduction of such information,36 and, in 
addition, created a civil cause of action for damages presumably 
for cases in which such criminal remedies were inadequate or 
ineffective.37 
In practice, however, these mechanisms have gone largely 
under-(if not un-)utilized. For example, the government reportedly 
failed to satisfy its notice obligations under FISA for a substantial 
period of time, culminating in a rare public concession by Solicitor 
General Verrilli in October 2013 that a number of defendants had 
not received the notice required by FISA—and had therefore been 
unable to vindicate their right to collaterally attack the underlying 
FISA warrant.38 
But even when defendants did receive the notice mandated by 
the statute (and, quite possibly, the Constitution), courts have 
                                                                                                     
 34. See supra notes 25–33 and accompanying text (discussing FISA warrant 
requirements and judicial review). 
 35. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(b) (2012). 
 36. Id. § 1806(f). 
 37. Id. § 1810.  
 38. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Door May Open for Challenge to Secret 
Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2013, at A3 (discussing how the provision of notice 
to criminal defendants opened the door to new legal challenges to certain 
government surveillance programs). 
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refused to require the government to disclose the materials 
submitted in support of the underlying FISA application—holding, 
time and again, that such disclosure is not necessary to resolve the 
validity of the warrant or of the surveillance conducted pursuant 
thereto.39 Although it is impossible to assess the correctness of 
these rulings based solely on the public record, at least one circuit 
judge has suggested that the statutory process for resolving such 
“Franks”40 challenges in FISA cases is deeply flawed—and is, 
indeed, effectively unavailable to criminal defendants regardless 
of the merits of their claims.41 
Finally, even though FISA is the rare example of a statute 
creating an express civil cause of action for damages in the 
national security sphere,42 the rare plaintiffs who can actually 
prove that they were subjected to secret surveillance under FISA 
(and who therefore have standing to even invoke FISA’s cause of 
action)43 have run into federal court decisions holding, rather 
counterintuitively, that FISA is not an express waiver of the 
United States government’s “sovereign immunity,” so damages are 
not available against the government itself.44 
                                                                                                     
 39. United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479, 486 (7th Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 1456 (2015). 
 40. In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the Supreme Court held that 
a defendant has a right to challenge a search or arrest warrant on the ground that 
it was procured by a knowing or reckless falsehood by the officer who applied for 
the warrant—and that district courts are entitled to conduct adversarial hearings 
to resolve such claims. See id. at 169–72 (discussing probable cause requirements 
and district court hearings). 
 41. See Daoud, 755 F.3d at 485–96 (Rovner, J., concurring) (“As a practical 
matter, the secrecy shrouding the FISA process renders it impossible for a 
defendant to meaningfully obtain relief under Franks . . . .”); see also Steve 
Vladeck, Judge Posner v. Judge Rovner: On Daoud, FISA, and Franks, LAWFARE 
(June 17, 2014, 7:56 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/06/judge-posner-v-
judge-rovner-on-daoud-fisa-and-franks/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2015) (comparing the 
majority and concurring opinions in the Daoud case) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 42. See 50 U.S.C. § 1810 (2012) (creating a civil cause of action). 
 43. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013) (finding 
a lack of standing and reasoning that a present injury is not established where a 
party could show no more than a risk of surveillance). 
 44. See al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Obama, 705 F.3d 845, 855 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (holding that Congress “deliberately did not waive immunity with 
respect to § 1810”). 
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The net effect of these three interrelated phenomena has been 
to call into serious question just how meaningful an opportunity 
FISA provides to those whose communications are intercepted 
pursuant to a FISA warrant to collaterally attack that warrant. 
And insofar as the existence of such collateral proceedings is a 
necessary element of any Article III defense of the role of the FISC, 
their practical unavailability may well call that defense into 
serious question. As Professor Robert Chesney suggested in 2013 
congressional testimony, the possibility that a FISA warrant today 
will meaningfully be litigated in subsequent judicial proceedings is 
a “razor-thin legal fiction.”45 
B. Moving Away from the Warrant Analogy 
And yet, as significant as these developments have been in 
calling into question the strength of the warrant analogy, shifts in 
the substantive authorities that the FISC is tasked with 
overseeing—and the review the FISC provides—have all but 
eviscerated even the “razor-thin legal fiction” that the warrant 
analogy still provides for “classic” FISA applications.  
For example, Congress in 1998 for the first time authorized 
the FISC to approve more than just an individual warrant, giving 
its judges the power under new “Title V” of the Act to issue “an 
order authorizing a common carrier, public accommodation 
facility, physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility to release 
records in its possession for an investigation to gather foreign 
intelligence information or an [FBI] investigation concerning 
international terrorism . . . .”46 Whereas classic FISA “warrants” 
required a determination of probable cause to believe that the 
target was (or was an agent of) a foreign power, this new provision 
only required a determination that “there are specific and 
articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom 
                                                                                                     
 45. Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for 
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the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power.”47 Thus, the 1998 amendment still required a nexus to an 
identified suspect, but the role of the FISC had shifted—
fundamentally—from approving something akin to a search 
warrant to signing off on something that looked much more like a 
subpoena directed to a (narrow) class of innocent third parties. 
After the September 11 attacks, Congress dramatically 
expanded the business records provision through § 215 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001.48 In particular, § 215 rewrote Title V to 
empower the FISC to require “the production of any tangible 
things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other 
items) for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence 
information not concerning a United States person or to protect 
against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
activities.”49 Unlike the 1998 language, § 215 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act was not limited to a small class of businesses, nor 
did it require any showing of a connection between the “tangible 
things” being sought and “a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power.”50 
Instead, all the government had to show—and all the FISC 
was allowed to require—was that “there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to an 
authorized investigation (other than a threat assessment) 
conducted . . . to obtain foreign intelligence information not 
concerning a United States person or to protect against 
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”51 
Thus, whereas the 1998 addition of Title V could have been 
defended as a shift in the degree of the FISC’s review, § 215 
represented a shift in kind—away from any individualized inquiry 
about suspected agents of a foreign power and toward far broader, 
“bulk” collection against putatively unidentified individuals. 
Perhaps because of the fundamental shift in the role of the 
FISC that § 215 portended, the USA PATRIOT Act also for the first 
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time authorized adversarial participation before the FISC. Thus, 
anyone receiving a “production order” under § 215 was given the 
right to challenge the order before the FISC on the ground that it 
“does not meet the requirements of [section 215] or is otherwise 
unlawful.”52 And if such a challenge was unsuccessful, the 
recipient was further empowered to file a petition for review of the 
FISC’s decision with the FISCR—and, if they were unsuccessful 
there, a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme 
Court.53 Tellingly, though, as of July, 2013, no recipient of a 
production order under § 215 had ever availed themselves of the 
adversarial review Congress had provided.54 
Although Congress amended FISA a number of times in the 
ensuing years,55 the next major shift in the role of the FISC came 
via the temporary Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA),56 which was 
quickly followed by the more permanent FISA Amendments Act of 
2008 (FAA).57 Whereas section 215 was directed toward 
surveillance conducted within the United States, both the PAA and 
FAA were principally concerned with the collection of information 
involving non-U.S. persons, but that transited through servers, 
internet switches, or other infrastructure located within the 
United States.58 To that end, Congress authorized the government 
to obtain “directives” from the FISC—annual authorizations for 
the programmatic collection of communications that, so long as 
they were not targeted at U.S. persons, would be reviewed by the 
FISC solely for adherence to a series of (detailed) procedural 
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requirements.59 Thus, and unlike § 215, new § 702 of FISA 
appeared to enlist the FISC in ex ante approval of programmatic 
surveillance—as opposed to applying legal principles to specific 
facts. 
As in § 215, Congress again provided for adversarial review, 
authorizing an “electronic communication service provider” that 
received such a “directive” to seek to modify or set aside the 
directive on the ground that “the directive does not meet the 
requirements of [the FAA], or is otherwise unlawful.”60 The 2007 
and 2008 Acts also provided far more detail about what such 
judicial review should look like, including procedures for initial 
(and, if warranted, “plenary”) review,61 and express authorization 
to hold non-compliant parties in contempt.62 As with § 215, the 
party that lost in the FISC was given an express right to appeal to 
the FISCR and, if necessary, to the Supreme Court.63 
Unlike § 215, these procedures have been taken advantage of 
at least once—culminating in a 2008 FISCR decision in a case we 
now know to have been brought by the technology company Yahoo!, 
in which the FISCR upheld the Protect America Act against a 
Fourth Amendment (but, tellingly, not an Article III64) challenge.65 
And yet, as of July, 2013, Yahoo!’s case was the only publicly 
acknowledged instance in which an electronic communication 
service provider had pursued the adversarial process provided by 
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either the 2007 or 2008 Acts.66 Whether because the FISCR’s 
decision in the Yahoo! case foreordained the merits of any such 
challenge, the providers had no interest in biting the hand that fed 
them, or any number of other reasons, the adversarial process 
Congress provided in the USA PATRIOT Act, the Protect America 
Act, and the FISA Amendments Act has proven more theoretical 
than real. 
C. The Contemporary FISC and Article III 
Given the virtually empty set of adversarial cases before the 
FISC, along with the concern that the recipients of production 
orders under the USA PATRIOT Act or directives under the FISA 
Amendments Act may not share the interests of their customers, 
one of the more common themes of calls for post-Snowden reforms 
to United States surveillance law and policy has been to provide 
for more adversarial participation before the FISC. Although these 
proposals have taken a number of forms, their core idea involves 
the creation of a “special advocate,” whose job is to appear opposite 
of the government in at least some cases before the FISC and to 
argue on behalf of the public, those whose communications are 
being targeted by the government application at issue, or some 
combination of the two.67 
Curiously, one of the objections that has been raised to such 
proposals is that such participation by a nominal adversary would 
not satisfy Article III.68 But as I have explained before,  
if the government’s application suffices to create an Article III 
case or controversy, that case or controversy necessarily 
persists for the duration of the authorities that the FISA Court’s 
granting of the application provides. That’s why . . . there is no 
Article III problem with having a “special advocate” participate 
in the FISA Court itself, even after the initial application has 
been approved.69 
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In other words, although there may be Article III problems with 
the FISC, it is difficult (if not impossible) to see how those problems 
are exacerbated (rather than ameliorated) by more consistent 
adversarial participation. The harder question is just how serious 
these Article III concerns truly are. In that respect, it will be 
helpful, once again, to differentiate between “classic” FISA and the 
newer authorities, especially those provided by the USA PATRIOT 
Act and the FISA Amendments Act. 
In the context of “classic” FISA, there are two different 
grounds on which the FISC’s fealty to Article III could be defended: 
First, razor-thin though the fiction may be, the analogy to 
warrants still holds, at least in theory.70 Thus, FISA warrants are 
generally still subject to collateral attack, whether through 
Franks-like motions to suppress in criminal cases, or through civil 
suits under FISA’s own cause of action.71 That these efforts rarely 
succeed does not of itself prove their unavailability.72 After all, 
even in the context of “ordinary” warrants, collateral attacks are, 
in practice, only realistically available in a small minority of 
cases.73 
Second, if one accepts the theory of “non-contentious 
jurisdiction” offered by James Pfander and Daniel Birk, “classic” 
FISA would satisfy Article III whether or not warrants issued by 
the FISC were in fact ancillary to subsequent judicial 
proceedings.74 As they explain, “the FISC’s role in hearing warrant 
applications on an ex parte basis seems to fit comfortably within 
the scope of federal judicial power over matters of non-contentious 
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jurisdiction.”75 Thus, one could defend the work of the FISC in 
approving FISA warrants against an Article III challenge solely by 
reference to Pfander and Birk’s approach without regard to the 
remedies actually available in subsequent criminal or civil 
proceedings. Taken together, then, it seems likely that, insofar as 
FISA satisfied Article III at its inception, the FISC is continuing 
to satisfy Article III today at least when called upon to issue 
individualized FISA warrants.76 
As should be clear by now, the far closer question is whether 
the FISC is also acting consistently with Article III when it issues 
production orders under § 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, or when 
it issues directives under § 702 of FISA as provided in the FISA 
Amendments Act. To reiterate, such proceedings raise two 
separate Article III concerns: First, unless the recipient of the 
production order or directive chooses to object, there is no adverse 
party before the FISC—and, unlike in the context of classic FISA, 
no meaningful analogy to ordinary warrants with regard to the 
availability of collateral attacks in subsequent judicial proceedings 
or with regard to Pfander and Birk’s theory of “non-contentious 
jurisdiction.”77 Second, insofar as the FISC is asked in these cases 
to do something other than apply established law to case-specific 
facts, there is also a concern that there is no “case or controversy” 
for the court to decide, more generally.78 
Ultimately, it is impossible to predict whether the Supreme 
Court might eventually find either of these Article III objections 
convincing. On the one hand, both the USA PATRIOT Act and the 
FISA Amendments Act do contemplate adversarial participation, 
even if they do not mandate it in every case.79 And although the 
FISA Amendments Act, especially, seems to enlist the FISC in 
approving relatively abstract authorizations, federal courts often 
play a largely similar role in the context of reviewing other 
                                                                                                     
 75. Pfander & Birk, supra note 26, at 1464. 
 76. See supra notes 52–68 (discussing the changes in warrant procedures 
since FISC’s inception). 
 77. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the adverseness 
requirement and its relation to FISC). 
 78. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the Article III case 
or controversy requirement as applied to FISC). 
 79. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the adverseness 
requirement and its relation to FISC). 
The FISA Court and Article III 1179 
administrative action—the abstract nature of which has not 
generally been fatal to the courts’ power to entertain facial (as 
opposed to “as applied”) challenges thereto. 
On the other hand, the warrant analogy was weak enough to 
begin with and there have been vanishingly few examples of 
adversarial participation under the procedures Congress created 
in the USA PATRIOT Act and the FISA Amendments Act. Thus, 
one could certainly sympathize with arguments such as those 
made in a recent Brennan Center report—that the FISC probably 
is acting in violation of Article III when it approves directives 
under the FISA Amendments Act and perhaps when it approves 
production orders under § 215, as well.80 And unlike in the context 
of classic FISA warrants, neither of these authorities would seem 
to be examples of the kind of “non-contentious jurisdiction” for 
which Pfander and Birk have suggested no meaningful ancillary 
proceedings are constitutionally necessary. 
Whether or not they are meritorious, the Article III concerns 
raised by how the FISC handles government applications under 
both the USA PATRIOT Act and the FISA Amendments Act should 
at the very least be strong enough so as to encourage Congress, as 
it did when it enacted FISA originally, to take steps to mitigate the 
potential unconstitutionality. Mandating adversarial participation 
by a “special advocate,” at least in cases arising under the USA 
PATRIOT Act and the FISA Amendments Act, could only be a 
salutary measure in that respect.81 Indeed, although the 
participation of a meaningful adversary would not vitiate the 
case-or-controversy objections to § 702, it would certainly convert 
judicial review of directives under the FISA Amendments Act to 
something that far more closely resembles ordinary administrative 
law processes, for which the Article III precedents are far better 
established.  
At that point, to be sure, one might well wonder why a 
super-secret court designed to act ex parte and in camera should 
also be in charge of reviewing such fundamentally different 
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surveillance authorities. But that debate would largely take place 
on terms of prudential wisdom, at least, and not constitutionality. 
